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 INCREASING TRANSPARENCY IN
 GOVERNMENT*
 Ann M. Florini Senior Fellow
 The Brookings Institution
 1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
 Washington, DC 20036
 USA
 Ann M. Florini is Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. She has been associated with
 UCLA, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund,
 and the United Nations Association of the USA. Her latest book is The Coming Democracy:
 New Rules for Running a New World (Island Press 2003).*This article was written for the
 Eleanor Roosevelt Institute for Justice and Peace for the forthcoming book, The Future of
 Feace in the Twenty-First Century. ?Eleanor Roosevelt Institute for Justice and Peace.
 A key to good governance is to
 make governments and markets
 transparent. Transparency runs
 counter to incentives of agents
 to create feifdoms at the expense
 of those they have been chosen
 to serve. This is true of national
 governements, corporations,
 international organizations, and
 even organizations designed to
 promote transparency.
 Dr. Florini discusses the
 history of transparency in
 government, in corporate
 life, and in international
 organizations. Increased calls
 for transparency arose after the
 Cold War in the 1990s, but
 backsliding has occurred since
 September 11, 2001.
 Of particular interest is
 the author's discussion of
 transparency issues related to the
 World Bank, the WTO, and to
 environmental protection.
 Information is the lifeblood of both
 d mocracies and markets. Without infor
 mation, citizens have no basis upon which
 to valuate their representatives or voice
 their opinions, and both elections and the
 very process of representation become a
 meaningless sham. Without information,
 the financial markets upon which modern
 economies depend become irrational
 exercises in guesswork, and governmen
 tal regulators cannot hope to carry out
 their responsibilities. The key to good
 governance is thus to make governments
 and markets transparent. And as the
 world becomes more tightly integrated,
 a compelling need is arising to ensure
 that people in one part of the globe have
 acc ss to information about what is going
 on elsewhere, so that they can have voice in
 far-away matters that now affect them di
 rectly. Only such open flows of information
 can ensure that governments and economic
 systems will enjoy the long-term stability
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 INCREASING TRANSPARENCY IN GOVERNMENT
 and widespread legitimacy upon which peace and prosperity depend.
 That is a daunting task. The world has too few mechanisms for collecting
 and distributing information, and the people who have information often
 have incentives not to share it. But it is by no means undoable.
 Transparency is one end of a long continuum of behavior. At one
 extreme, nothing is hidden. All government files are open to inspection
 by anyone wanting to see them, and meetings are always public. At the
 other, secrecy reigns supreme, and no one outside the narrow circles of
 government is permitted to know anything. No country actually functions
 at either extreme, but some come close. Sweden first enshrined the ideal of
 public access to information in its basic law in 1766 and now is among the
 world's most effective practioners and promoters of transparency. Countries
 like Iraq fall closer to the other end of the spectrum. The task is thus to
 move global society closer to the transparency end of the spectrum.
 Such movement is possible because the degree of transparency that
 prevails is the result of deliberate choices. Governments must choose to
 release information. Sometimes those choices are governed by specific laws
 or constitutional requirements, and sometimes they are individual initiatives
 on an ad hoc basis. But files do not open themselves. Increasing transparency
 requires that someone, somewhere, decides to hand over information.
 The stakes are high. Those choices now lie at the heart of the debate
 over democracy, governance, the international economy, and the fate of
 an increasingly globalized world. Everyone, from leaders of international
 organizations to protestors on the street, is demanding that others turn
 over information. But at the same time, powerful forces are fighting back,
 arguing that information can be misused by corporate competitors, other
 governments, even terrorists. The outcome of the battle between transpar
 ency and secrecy will do much to determine whether the twenty-first century
 sees endless conflict, or long-term peace and prosperity.
 This chapter will address several specific matters. First, it investigates how
 transparency is related directly to achieving and maintaining international
 peace, by transforming the security relationship between countries. Second,
 it examines transparency's indirect role in contributing to legitimate and
 effective governance. Third, it explores the trends in transparency in national
 politics, international organizations, and environmental management.
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 GLOBAL SECURITY THROUGH TRANSPARENCY
 Over the past five decades, a new idea has grown deep roots: that states
 can pursue security not through the threat or use of force, but by actively
 persuading others that they have nothing to fear. That persuasion takes
 the form of detailed disclosures about military practices and capabilities.
 Transparency both constrains a state's ability to undertake successful ag
 gression and, increasingly, provides a powerful signal of benign intentions.
 Today, the world's major military powers have enmeshed themselves in a
 web of confidence-building measures and arms-control treaty verification
 provisions that, taken together, require an extraordinary level of disclosure.
 Those transparency measures range from relatively painless steps, such as
 refraining from concealing activities
 from surveillance satellites, to more
 difficult measures such as providing
 detailed data disclosures, up to the
 point of requiring countries to host
 highly intrusive inspections of sensi
 tive military and civilian installations.
 The extent of transparency
 in the security field is particularly
 striking in view of how rapidly
 countries have scaled that ladder of
 increasingly intrusive transparency
 measures, starting from attitudes
 less than a century ago that found
 the whole idea of transparency an
 intolerable invasion of national sov
 The extent of transpar
 ency in the security
 field is particularly strik
 ing in view of how
 rapidly countries have
 scaled that ladder of
 increasingly intrusive
 transparency measures,
 starting from attitudes
 less than a century ago
 that found the whole
 idea of transparency an
 intolerable invasion of
 national sovereignty.
 ereignty. The first significant proposals in the early part of the twenty-first
 century met a chilly response. The Treaty of Versailles, at the insistence of
 the French, contained provisions for regular and detailed inspections of
 Germany. Those provisions were not, of course, "voluntary" for Germany,
 and it is hardly surprising that Germany's compliance was limited. The more
 difficult reaction to explain was that of the United States and Britain. The
 British and Americans seemed far more concerned with upholding norms
 of sovereignty over the often-incompatible requirements of disclosure. The
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 Americans argued that a Peace Treaty that returned sovereignty to Ger
 many could not simultaneously undermine that sovereignty with disclosure
 requirements.1 The British objected on pragmatic grounds that intrusive
 requirements such as inspections would more likely provoke conflict than
 bolster the cause of peace.2 The end result was a compromise between the
 French desire for a permanent monitoring commission and the British and
 American preference for reliance solely on the reports of their military at
 taches regarding Germany's compliance with its disarmament obligations.
 Under Articles 203 and 204 of the Treaty of Versailles, three Inter-Allied
 Control Commissions were established to monitor German compliance,
 and Article 205 gave the Commissions the authority to inspect any site in
 German territory at any time.3
 The system did not last long largely because the concept of expecting
 transparency from a sovereign state remained anathema to so many. By
 1922, Germany was openly defying the obligatory inspections. Despite
 strident French protests, German intransigence went unpunished, and in
 January 1927 the last of the Control Commissions was dissolved, even
 though the Allies recognized that German non-compliance with its disarma
 ment obligations remained significant.4
 Arms-control treaties of the time similarly indicated little support
 for notions of transparency. The most important of the interwar security
 agreements, the three multilateral treaties on naval arms control generally
 referred to as the Washington Treaty system, generally relied for verifica
 tion solely on the traditional method of reporting by military attaches.
 The disarmament efforts of the League of Nations, in a series of meetings
 beginning in 1925, found themselves most deeply divided over the issue
 of what, if any, verification measures should apply to any convention. The
 United States, Britain, Chile, Sweden, and Italy favored reliance on the good
 faith of nations, while Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Poland,
 Romania and Yugoslavia wanted a permanent supervisory agent.5 By the
 first session of the World Disarmament Conference in July 1932, the United
 States had shifted to a vague call for adequate measures of supervision and
 control, probably in response to public pressures stemming from the lack
 of adequate information on the Japanese invasion of Manchuria.6 When
 Franklin Roosevelt, who had long supported greater transparency to verify
 arms control compliance, became president, progress on transparency for
 6
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 the first time began to seem possible.7 But by 1934 the negotiations had
 collapsed for other reasons, and the evolution of transparency in the security
 field had to wait decades for a more propitious climate.
 After World War II, the United States took on France's previous role
 as the leading promoter of transparency in the security field, in a generally
 futile effort to elicit information about its highly secretive adversary in the
 emerging Cold War. From the beginning, U.S. early proposals for nuclear
 arms control included highly intrusive inspection provisions.8 The most
 dramatic move came with President Dwight D. Eisenhower's 1955 "Open
 Skies" proposal to allow the United States and the USSR to overfly each
 other as a means of building confidence that no untoward or threatening
 activities were going on below.9 Although discussions continued for several
 years, they proved inconclusive, and Open Skies faded away once the advent
 of spy satellites rendered the need for aerial overflights less pressing. In talks
 about general and complete disarmament, the U.S. and the USSR used
 rhetoric endorsing unprecedented transparency measures, none of which
 led to concrete agreements.
 In the 1960s, both superpowers began spy satellite programs that
 introduced a substantial degree of involuntary transparency, but they
 refrained from making efforts to shoot down one another's satellites, a
 kind of tacit acceptance of the resulting disclosures of information.10 Such
 national technical means enabled the two superpowers to finesse the whole
 problem of information disclosure in the first major nuclear-arms control
 accord, the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty.11 In the SALT I interim agree
 ment limiting deployments of strategic nuclear-launch vehicles and in the
 Anti-Ballistic Misile (ABM) Treaty curtailing development and deployment
 of strategic defenses, both in 1972, the two sides made that tacit acceptance
 explicit, promising not to interfere with or use deliberate concealment
 measures against each other's national technical means of verification.12 In
 other bilateral nuclear arms control treaties negotiated in the 1970s, the
 superpowers agreed to add some (unverified) data exchanges to the arsenal
 of transparency provisions.13 One, which did not come into force until the
 1990s, would have allowed mutual on-site inspections under restricted
 conditions, a real breakthrough in transparency for the time.14
 In 1968, the adoption of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) expanded
 the application of significant transparency measures to a wide range of
 countries.15 The Treaty required signatories that were not already recognized
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 as possessing nuclear weapons to allow the International Atomic Energy
 Agency to monitor all of its nuclear facilities and materials to determine
 whether they were being diverted for use in a weapons program.
 On the conventional-weapons front, progress toward transparency was
 slow until well into the 1980s. The 1976 Helsinki accord among member
 nations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and other European countries
 introduced some basic transparency provisions such as advance notification
 of planned large military maneuvers, largely at the insistence of the neutral
 and non-aligned states.16
 But as it turned out, all these relatively minor steps cumulatively laid
 the groundwork for what would become a major transformation in the
 1980s. Some of this was superpower politicking?various members of
 By the early 1990s a
 norm of transparency
 had become thor
 oughly entrenched
 in the security area
 among the former ad
 versaries of the Cold
 War. Two decades ago
 they were prepared to
 send one another into
 oblivion.
 the Reagan administration, which
 came to power in 1982, made
 sweeping transparency proposals
 either because they believed such
 transparency was essential to deter
 what they saw as inevitable Soviet
 cheating, or because they abhorred
 arms control altogether and found
 such proposals a politically expedient
 means of deflecting pressure for seri
 ous negotiations. But when Mikhail
 Gorbachev came to power, things
 changed. Virtually the first move
 that the new Soviet leadership made to demonstrate its new international
 attitude was to agree to accept mandatory foreign inspection of much of
 its territory to demonstrate that their military maneuvers did not exceed
 various restrictions.17 Over the next few years, transparency-related propos
 als flew fast and furious between the two sides. By 1991, they had signed a
 Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces in Europe; an agreement to
 reduce, not just limit, their strategic nuclear delivery vehicles; and a Treaty
 on Conventional Forces in Europe, all requiring very detailed exchanges of
 data and numerous and intrusive on-site inspections of military facilities.
 They even managed to sign, at long last, an Open Skies accord among all
 the members of NATO and the by then former Warsaw Pact, permitting
 8
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 overflights of one another's territory, although that treaty has never come
 into effect.18
 By the early 1990s, in other words, a norm of transparency had become
 thoroughly entrenched in the security area among the former adversaries
 of the Cold War. Two decades ago they were prepared to send one another
 into oblivion. Now, they think nothing of providing one another with
 detailed listings of all military holdings and inviting one another's military
 commanders to check out their latest equipment.
 In the 1990s, security-related transparency began to reach well be
 yond the European context. The Gulf War, and especially the subsequent
 revelations about Iraq's broad-brush efforts to develop weapons of mass
 destruction on the sly, led to several major multilateral agreements. It
 showed the limits of effectiveness of the multilateral transparency instru
 ments then in use, such as the inspection of nuclear facilities mandated by
 NPT. The experience of the inspections system imposed on Iraq as part of
 the cease-fire terms indicated just how intrusive transparency might have
 to be to address proliferation threats.
 Following the Gulf War, revelations about Iraq's nuclear, chemical,
 and biological weapons program led to U.N. Security Council resolu
 tions requiring Iraq to dismantle those programs, subject to sweepingly
 intrusive monitoring by the IAEA and a United Nations Special Commis
 sion (UNSCOM). Perhaps the most striking evidence of the degree to
 which transparency is now seen as normal in international relations was
 the unanimity with which the international community agreed to impose
 the most stringent monitoring conditions possible, not only on the Iraqi
 disarmament process, but on Iraq for the foreseeable future. To verify
 that Iraq's ability to make weapons of mass destruction was eliminated,
 the United Nations Security Council imposed extraordinarily intrusive
 transparency measures.19 To carry out these measures, the U.N. created
 UNSCOM, with virtually unlimited authority to go anywhere and see
 anything in Iraq to uncover and dismantle Iraq's biological, chemical, and
 ballistic missile programs. Security Council Resolution 687 also extended
 to the International Atomic Energy Agency an enhanced inspection and
 monitoring mandate. Both the IAEA and UNSCOM were charged with
 ensuring that existing systems and production facilities were destroyed and
 with establishing and implementing a long-term monitoring plan to guard
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE
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 against any revival of the programs.
 UNSCOM and the IAEA inspectors began their work with the premise
 that Iraq had accepted the terms of the resolution and that their work would
 be much like that of verifiers of arms-control treaties, who must be alert for
 cheating but generally expect to find compliance. As any reader of headlines
 in the 1990s knows, they were sorely disappointed. Iraq made innumerable
 efforts to delay handing over information, providing incomplete or blatantly
 falsified documents, interfering with and intimidating UNSCOM and IAEA
 inspectors, and in general evading the letter and the intent of its legal obliga
 tion under Resolution 687.20 Although the international community has
 been badly divided over how strongly to deal with Iraq, it is striking that
 Iraqi complaints that the inspections constitute an affront to its national
 sovereignty have fallen on deaf ears, in sharp contrast to the post-Versailles
 experience of Germany. Then, as described above, some members of the
 victorious coalition publicly and privately expressed their sympathy with
 Germany's sense of forced disclosure as an affront. Now, some of the victors
 may be more interested in pursuing their vested economic interests in Iraq
 than in ensuring that Iraq cannot bring its weapons programs back. But
 with the exception of China, which has consistently abstained from U.N.
 votes regarding Iraqi inspections, no country has objected to the idea of
 enforced monitoring.
 One of the most important effects of the Iraqi revelations was to spur
 multilateral agreement on a highly intrusive treaty to ban possession and
 production of chemical weapons. As of 1999, the Chemical Weapons Con
 vention (CWC), which entered into force in 1997, had 170 signatories (of
 whom 126 had ratified the treaty). The treaty itself is less than 50 pages
 long, but the Verification Annex is more than twice that length. And the
 scrutiny to which they subject non-governmental actors, the provisions go
 beyond any other international agreement. The same chemicals that have
 revolutionized agriculture and medicine over the past century can be used
 to make chemical weapons. Because these substances are so widespread
 and so thoroughly integrated into the fabric of the international economy,
 with a few exceptions they cannot simply be banned. Instead, the verifica
 tion net must be cast both wide and deep, covering an enormous range of
 chemicals and imposing stringent verification requirements. These include
 routine and very-short-notice surprise inspections of a vast array of often
 10
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 privately-owned chemical facilities. The Organization for the Production
 of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), established by the terms of the CWC to
 carry out implementation, has carried out more than 500 such inspections
 in some 30 countries. In addition, parties are required to provide detailed
 declarations about which facilities on their territories produce or consume
 certain chemicals (above "threshold" amounts). All parties have access to
 the declarations of all other parties.
 Despite its high aspirations for transparency, the implementation record
 has been mixed. On the positive side, in 1996 the U.S. Department of
 Defense not only disclosed information required by the CWC but also
 declassified a multitude of details about the U.S. chemical-weapons stock
 pile.21 Britain makes all of its declarations publicly available.22 In July 1997,
 India, after years of denying that it had any weapons of mass destruction,
 openly declared its possession of stocks of chemical weapons, even though
 Pakistan had not yet ratified the CWC and even though India's chemical
 weapons program had not previously been publicly revealed.
 Unsurprisingly, the transparency provisions of the CWC have not
 been enthusiastically embraced by all parties. Many are failing to disclose
 all the information required by the CWC. More than a quarter have not
 even filed the mandatory initial declarations covering chemical weapons,
 weapons facilities, and portions of the commercial chemical industry. The
 United States has awarded itself the right to veto challenge inspections of
 U.S. facilities if the president so decides.23 Yet compared to the informa
 tion previously available to the public and to most governments, the CWC
 represents a striking advance.
 In addition to this web of formal transparency commitments, there is
 a large number of voluntary transparency arrangements and treaties that
 have not entered into force?and may never do so?but that incorporate
 stringent transparency procedures. One such is the Comprehensive Test Ban
 Treaty, which prohibits all nuclear explosions. It was signed by more than
 70 countries in September 1996 but is unlikely to enter into force because
 of the refusal of India to adhere and the recent rejection of the treaty by the
 United States Senate. The Treaty establishes an International Monitoring
 System (IMS) of 321 stations around the world, an International Data
 Center, a communications system, and on-site inspections to monitor com
 pliance, and the Preparatory Commission of what is intended to become
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE
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 the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is
 establishing the global verification system. It has to date exchanged more
 than 40 letters of agreement with 31 states hosting monitoring facilities
 to enable work to proceed, pending the conclusion of formal bilateral
 agreements, and has concluded such formal arrangements with Canada
 and New Zealand.
 The United Nations Register on Conventional Arms was established
 in response to the shock of the Gulf War, when members of the coalition
 against Iraq sometimes found themselves fighting weapons they themselves
 had originally supplied. The political impetus behind efforts to increase
 transparency in international conventional arms transfers came initially
 from Japan and Britain, with strong support from France and Germany.
 Negotiations over the establishment of the Register were heated. Developed
 countries proposed a Register in which countries would report only on
 transfers of finished conventional weapons. Pakistan argued that ignoring
 stockpiles and indigenous production of weapons would provide a very
 incomplete picture of arms. Egypt objected strongly to the exclusion of
 weapons of mass destruction, saying that by omitting these the Register
 could not provide an adequate basis for reasonable national security calcula
 tions. Brazil and Argentina, among others, questioned the focus on finished
 weapons systems, noting that transfers of dual-use technology mattered just
 as much as transfers of completed weapons systems.24 In the end, these
 objections were met largely by promises to consider them later, promises
 that have largely gone unfulfilled.
 Nonetheless, since the Register started in 1992, more than 90 reports
 have been filed every year, with 80 countries providing reports just about
 every year and many others participating more sporadically.25 These reports
 cover transfers of seven categories of major conventional weapons: battle
 tanks, armored combat vehicles, large-caliber artillery, combat aircraft,
 attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers. Because
 the United Nations provided few definitions about what constitutes a
 transfer (When a sale is agreed on? When the importer actually receives the
 weapons?), substantial discrepancies sometimes arise between the reports
 of exporters and importers.
 There are enormous regional discrepancies in participation rates.
 OECD states, countries of the former Soviet Union, the larger states of
 12
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 the Americas, and much of Asia regularly file reports. China participated
 until 1998, when it withdrew in protest over the inclusion of exports to
 Taiwan in the U.S. submission, arguing that "arms transfers from the U.S.
 to Taiwan are neither legitimate nor transfers between sovereign states."26
 In the Middle East and North Africa, only Israel and Iran regularly report,
 while members of the Arab League have refused to participate in a Register
 that does not encompass weapons of mass destruction. Few sub-Saharan
 countries take part.
 A variety of transparency-related security measures also exist at the
 regional level, beyond the European ones described above. Argentina
 and Brazil began a program of mutual inspections of each other's nuclear
 facilities in the late 1980s.27 In 1999, the Organization of American States
 adopted an Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional
 Arms Acquisitions.28 The Middle East has seen its share of transparency
 measures too, particularly in the form of mutually-agreed aerial monitoring
 of cease-fire zones.
 Overall, the idea of transparency as a contributor to rather than a threat
 to security is well established. It has become so widespread that it can no
 longer be seen as merely the result of a few states' calculation of immediate
 national self-interest. Rather, it reflects a wholesale shift in thinking: a change
 in norms as to what behavior is appropriate and desirable for states. A new
 standard of behavior now enables states to signal their non-aggressive,
 cooperative intentions.
 One major question-mark for the future is China. China has taken
 some significant steps toward greater transparency, accepting the verification
 provisions of the CWC, participating until recently in the UN Register,
 and taking part in military exchanges with the United States. But the key
 issue is not so much China's reaction to specific transparency proposals as
 China's acceptance or rejection of the broader normative structure within
 which transparency is embedded. China is still reluctant to embrace that
 normative structure, as its refusal to support international inspections of
 Iraq indicates. But that reluctance is not outright rejection.
 The other major, and as yet unanswerable, question is what conse
 quences the September 11,2001 attacks will have on global attitudes toward
 transparency. This question takes us beyond the security realm and will be
 addressed at the end of this chapter.
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 WHY TRANSPARENCY IS ESSENTIAL TO LEGITIMATE AND
 EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE
 In the security field, transparency has emerged for purely pragmatic reasons:
 It works. But the debate over transparency's broader role in governance
 is normative as well as practical. The justification for demanding greater
 transparency gets down to fundamental issues of the moral basis for gov
 ernance.
 Both governments and corporations suffer from what social scientists
 call the "principal-agent problem." Governments are not supposed to
 be independent actors doing whatever suits their own interests. They
 Governmental officials
 face incentives to in
 crease their budgets
 and bureaucratic fief
 doms, actions that do
 not necessarily serve
 the public interest. Simi
 larly, corporate manag
 ers often act to increase
 their personal incomes
 rather than the incomes
 of the shareholders they
 ostensibly serve.
 are supposed to be agents, acting
 on behalf of their "principals," the
 citizens. Similarly, corporate manag
 ers are supposed to be the agents of
 corporate stockholders, and increas
 ingly of other stakeholders such as
 local communities. But agents often
 have interests that differ from those
 of their principals. The academic
 school-of-thought known as public
 choice theory points out that gov
 ernmental officials face incentives to
 increase their budgets and bureau
 cratic fiefdoms, actions that do not
 necessarily serve the public interest.
 Similarly, corporate managers often act to increase their personal incomes
 rather than the incomes of the shareholders they ostensibly serve.
 Overcoming the principal-agent problem is thus one of the basic conun
 drums of governance, whether corporate or governmental. One of the basic
 solutions is to increase the transparency of the agent's behavior, making it
 possible for the principals to monitor what is going on. The informational
 asymmetry always favors the agents (agents inherendy know what they are
 doing, while principals have to come up with ways of finding out what the
 agents are up to), but transparency can go far to reduce that asymmetry
 and thus reduce the power the agents have over the principals. And it is a
 fundamental tenet of democratic theory that the accountability made pos
 14
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 sible by transparency leads to better results. Without transparency, there
 is no way to know whether institutions are pursuing their goals efficiently
 and effectively, or even whether they are pursuing the right goals.
 The principal-agent framework provides a powerful answer to the nor
 mative questions about the value of transparency. If agents are employed to
 serve the interests of the principals, the prevailing presumption should be
 in favor of agent transparency. Agents have no inherent rights to withhold
 information from principals.
 That leaves unanswered the pragmatic questions about how and when to
 promote transparency. After all, under some conditions secrecy is necessary
 to enable agents to serve the interests of the principals. Transparency is not
 always a good thing. It can be neutral, or even harmful. It merely enables
 people to acquire information. It
 does not by itself enable people to do
 anything with that information. Nor
 does it convey any understanding of
 the meaning of the information. It
 does little good if no one cares to do
 anything with the information. And
 sometimes the sheer cost of amassing
 information far outweighs the public
 benefit that would accrue from its
 disclosure.
 The list of situations in which
 disclosure can do more harm than
 While there are legiti
 mate grounds for secre
 cy and concerns about
 transparency, they are
 easily taken too far. Pro
 tection of national secu
 rity, for example, easily
 becomes an excuse for
 cover-ups of govern
 ment incompetence or
 venality.
 good is fairly obvious: national security, individual privacy, and corporate
 trade secrets all need protection. The same military information that reas
 sures other countries that your military forces are not massing for attack
 can enable others to locate and attack your forces. There is no public right
 to know the details of other people's private lives. Corporations depend
 on their trade secrets to stay in business.
 Moreover, in the absence of universally shared, or at least mutually
 compatible, norms, transparency can aggravate conflict. It may simply
 remove the ambiguity that can otherwise conceal conflicts or soften dis
 agreements. For example, the world is arguably better off politely ignoring
 Israel's well-known but undeclared nuclear capability than demanding that
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 Israel own up to it. Although the principle of nuclear non-proliferation is
 well established among most other countries, few expect that Israel can be
 made to accept it. The costs to the nonproliferation regime of forcing the
 issue may well be higher than the benefits.
 And information can easily be misused or misinterpreted. Transparency
 reveals behavior, but does not always give accurate clues about the meaning
 of that behavior. What someone is doing may be less important than why
 they are doing it. Americans do not worry about the British building nuclear
 weapons because Americans believe that Britain harbors no hostile intent.
 But they remain anxious about the possibility of a nuclear Iraq.
 But while there are legitimate grounds for secrecy and concerns about
 transparency, they are easily taken too far. Protection of national security,
 for example, easily becomes an excuse for cover-ups of government in
 competence or venality. And the costs of secrecy need to be kept in mind,
 even in these cases. When agents withhold information, they engender
 suspicion and hostility. They also are far more likely to make mistakes, even
 if their intentions are good. The complexity of many problems is simply
 too great for government managers to handle alone. They require feedback
 mechanisms so that new information is constandy incorporated. How can
 and should societies strike the appropriate balance?
 A BRIEF HISTORY OF TRANSPARENCY
 To answer that question, we start by looking at how the balance has varied
 over time. Demands for open flows of information have a long history in
 both politics and economics. One of the framers of the American Constitu
 tion, James Madison, wrote compellingly on the importance of information
 in a democracy:
 A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of
 acquiring it, is but prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or perhaps both.
 Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; and a people who mean to
 be their own governors must arm themselves with the power which
 knowledge gives.
 In the economic sphere, corporations have found themselves facing
 demands for disclosure of financial data for almost as long as publicly-held
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 corporations have existed. Great Britain experimented with disclosure laws
 starting in the mid-1800s.29 In America, starting early in the 1900s, large
 numbers of small investors proved able to put substantial political pressure
 on the government to institute corporate disclosure standards that would
 protect them from deceit and insider dealings. The first organized body of
 professional accountants was not formed in the United States until 1886 and
 until the turn of the century corporate disclosure was not a public issue.
 In the early part of the twentieth century, however, as in Great
 Britain, the extent of corporate disclosure gradually began to rise. That
 increase reflected significant changes in the nature of American business
 and investing, as some firms became too large to avoid scrutiny and, as in
 Britain, the number of small investors increased substantially. Those small
 investors proved willing to seek government action to reform commercial
 practices, accompanied by increasing criticism of management accounting
 and reporting practices by critics of big business and leaders of the public
 accounting profession. During the 1920s, the Investment Bankers Associa
 tion of America tried to promote voluntary financial disclosure in order to
 protect legitimate investment bankers from the growing public resentment
 against the sellers of fraudulent securities and to forestall governmental
 regulation. In 1926, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) officially rec
 ommended that all listed companies publish quarterly reports containing
 some minimal disclosure of financial information.30 At the same time, the
 American Institute of Accountants, the leading association of accountants,
 began to promote the development of standards of auditing and accounting,
 and encouraged the Stock Exchange to move further in this direction. In
 1933, the NYSE announced that henceforth it would require independent
 audits of companies seeking a listing on the exchange, a practice already
 voluntarily followed by 90 percent of listed industrial companies.31
 These moves proved insufficient to fend off the enactment of federal
 legislation. Spurred by the 1930s backlash against unregulated capitalism,
 the 1934 Security Exchange Act authorized the creation of a regulatory
 agency, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), that would over
 see a variety of new mandatory corporate disclosure practices. Companies
 whose securities were listed on national securities exchanges were thence
 forth required to file periodic reports whose form and content would be
 determined by the SEC.32 In subsequent years, the SEC worked with the
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 American Institute of Accountants to establish the new standards, principles
 and practices of accounting and auditing.33
 After World War II, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article
 19) explicitly recognized the right to "freedom of opinion and expres
 sion: this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference
 and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media
 and regardless of frontiers" (emphasis added). But with the expansion of
 governmental bureaucracies in many countries and with the emergence of
 multinational corporations and large inter-governmental organizations came
 new concentrations of power able to withhold information from people
 whose lives they affected. At the same time, the Cold War led to the rise
 of a highly secretive national security complex in the traditional bastion of
 transparency, the United States.
 Counter-pressures to all this were limited, although there were some.
 The real explosion of
 global demands for
 transparency came in
 the 1990s. At that time,
 the end of the Cold
 War eliminated one
 significant rationale for
 extreme secrecy.
 One notable victory for transparency
 came in the form of the U.S. Free
 dom of Information Act, first passed
 in 1966 and strengthened in 1974.
 In the 1980s, transnational networks
 of civil society activists launched cam
 paigns demanding information from
 inter-governmental organizations,
 particularly the World Bank. East and
 West negotiated some arms control
 agreements that included verification provisions that made the security
 establishments of the two sides increasing transparent to each other.
 But the real explosion of global demands for transparency came in the
 1990s. At that time, the end of the Cold War eliminated one significant
 rationale for extreme secrecy. The spread of democratic norms, the in
 creasing strength of civil society organizations, and the rise of increasingly
 independent media around the world have intensified pressures on govern
 ments to release information to their citizens. At the same time, global
 economic integration has led international investors (and the governments
 of capital-rich countries) to demand disclosures on corporate and national
 accounts in emerging economies, especially in the wake of the Asian crisis,
 which many blamed on the excessive secrecy of the Asian corporations and
 18
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 governments. International financial institutions, which are major promoters
 of economic integration, are demanding information from governments and
 then posting that information on web sites. Those international institutions
 themselves face intense pressure from activists around the world to open
 up their analyses and processes of decision making. All these demands are
 facilitated by information technology, which is making information ever
 easier to locate and share.
 Now a broad struggle is underway between the forces of secrecy and the
 promoters of transparency. Freedom of Information laws and constitutional
 provisions are popping up in countries from the United Kingdom to South
 Africa to Thailand to Japan, but many are weak or are not being fully
 implemented. Intergovernmental organizations of all types are debating
 new or revised disclosure policies. Environmental management is entering
 a third wave, based not on centralized regulation or market-based incen
 tives but instead on what might be called "regulation by revelation." The
 backlash against transparency has been strengthened, though not caused,
 by the horrific events of September 11,2001. Below we will see where the
 struggle stands.
 NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
 The world is awash in proposals to require national governments to increase
 public access to information about them. Some of these demands are occur
 ring in countries that have recently made, or are trying to make, a transition
 from autocracy to democracy, but many are taking place in countries long
 seen as well-established democracies that are good at holding free elections
 but not necessarily so good at keeping their citizens informed. Some of the
 constitutions of newly democratic or democratizing states contain provi
 sions requiring governments to provide information to their citizens. In
 other cases, countries are enacting Freedom of Information Acts (FOIA)
 that lay out how citizens can get information from their governments, and
 restricting the conditions under which governments are allowed to refuse
 those requests.
 Sweden claims pride of place as the first country to adopt a law, its
 press freedom act, requiring access to governmental information, in 1766.
 Finland was also an early adopter of formal legislation, with its Publicity of
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 Documents Act adopted in 1951.34 The United States followed with the
 Freedom of Information Act in 1966, although it was not until the Act was
 strengthened in 1974 in response to the Watergate scandal that meaningful
 implementation began. The momentum then picked up, with five additional
 countries adopting FOIAs in the 1970s, and six in the 1980s. By the 1990s,
 a wave of countries began debating the desirability of increasing government
 transparency, with 12 countries enacting FOIAs. South Africa has powerful
 transparency provisions written into its 1996 constitution.35 Also in the
 1990s, the United States passed an Electronic Freedom of Information
 Act to extend FOIA provisions to cover information not available in print.
 Following a report by a bipartisan national Commission on Government
 The details raise serious
 questions about just how
 far the laws contribute
 to the transparency of
 governments... Even in
 countries with strong
 Freedom of Information
 laws, bureaucrats who
 want to withhold infor
 mation find many ways
 to hold on to secrets.
 In the U.S. case, for ex
 ample, implementation
 continues to fall far short
 of expectations.
 Secrecy headed by Senator Daniel
 Patrick Moynihan that was highly
 critical of governmental secrecy,
 the U.S. Congress began debating
 new legislation that would reduce
 the propensity of the governmental
 bureaucracy to classify everything
 in sight.36 More recently, Bosnia,
 the United Kingdom, and Bulgaria
 adopted legislation. Laws are under
 discussion in India, Fiji, Botswana,
 Lithuania, Moldova, and Nigeria.37
 Although this adds up to an
 impressive-looking flurry of activity,
 the devil is, as always, in the details.
 For many of these laws, the details
 raise serious questions about just how
 far the laws contribute to the transparency of governments. The proposed
 legislation in Zimbabwe and Belarus, for example, arguably constitute
 something closer to official secrets acts than to means of shifting govern
 ments closer to the transparency end of the continuum.
 Even in countries with strong Freedom of Information laws, bureaucrats
 who want to withhold information find many ways to hold on to secrets.
 In the U.S. case, for example, implementation continues to fall far short of
 expectations. Part of the problem is sheer shortage of funding and person
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 nel to respond to the 600,000 requests for information made under the
 law each year. FOIA offices within agencies are chronically under-funded
 and short-staffed, so it is unsurprising that most U.S. FOIA offices are
 backlogged?that is, they are not in compliance with the law's demand
 that FOIA requests receive a response within twenty days. Some agencies,
 like the CIA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Departments of
 Energy and State, take a year or two on average to respond. And often the
 responses themselves consist of heavily blanked-out documents. Even worse
 is compliance with the 1996 Electronic Freedom of Information Act, requir
 ing government agencies to make computer databases, electronic documents,
 word processing documents, and even mail accessible to the public, to create
 "electronic reading rooms" that would contain substantial information, and
 to publish an annual report on their FOIA activities. Although many agen
 cies have created the required web sites, many are hard to find and woefully
 incomplete, and compliance with requests for electronic information suffer
 all the problems seen with requests for paper documents.
 The problems with implementation are partly normal bureaucratic
 matters, but they also reflect competing conceptions within the United
 States of what information should be freely available. The political parties
 have been feuding for decades over what constitutes compliance with the
 1966 Freedom of Information Act. The feud takes particularly visible
 form in the competing memos issued by successive Attorneys General.
 Whenever a new administration of a different party from the preceding
 administration takes office, the Attorney General sends a memorandum to
 the heads of all federal departments and agencies laying out the standard
 the Department of Justice will use in deciding whether to defend agency
 decisions on FOIA matters when those decisions are challenged in court.
 The first was issued in May 1977 by Attorney General Griffin B. Bell when
 the Carter administration took office. The second was issued in May 1981
 by the Reagan Administration's new Attorney General, William French
 Smith. None came from the first Bush Administration. Attorney General
 Janet Reno, who served under President Clinton, issued the third in Oc
 tober 1993, and the fourth came from Attorney General John Ashcroft
 on October 12,2001.
 A comparison of the two most recent memos illustrates how great the
 differences in implementation of transparency laws can be.
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE
 VOL. XIX NO. 3 SEPTEMBER 2002  21
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Fri, 13 Oct 2017 02:43:57 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 INCREASING TRANSPARENCY IN GOVERNMENT
 The Reno memo pushes agencies to
 ensure that the principle of openness in government is applied in each and
 every disclosure and nondisclosure decision that is required under the Act."
 It therefore "rescind[s] the Department of Justice's 1981 guidelines for
 the defense of agency action in Freedom of Information Act litigation. The
 Department will no longer defend an agency's withholding of information
 merely because there is a "substantial legal basis" for doing so. Rather, in
 determining whether or not to defend a nondisclosure decision, we will
 apply a presumption of disclosure.... In short, it shall be the policy of the
 U.S. Department of Justice to defend the assertion of a FOIA exemption
 only in those cases where the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure
 would be harmful to an interest protected by that exemption. Where an
 item of information might technically or arguably fall within an exemption,
 it ought not to be withheld from a FOIA requester unless it need be.38
 The Ashcroft memo, after a quick genuflection in honor of govern
 mental accountability, makes clear that it intends to strike rather a different
 balance than the previous administration. It says:
 The Department of Justice and this Administration are equally committed
 to protecting other fundamental values that are held by our society. Among
 them are safeguarding our national security, enhancing the effectiveness of
 our law enforcement agencies, protecting sensitive business information,
 and, not least, preserving personal privacy... I encourage your agency
 to carefully consider the protection of all such values and interests when
 making disclosure determinations under the FOIA. Any discretionary
 decision by your agency to disclose information protected under the
 FOIA should be made only after full and deliberate consideration of the
 institutional, commercial, and personal privacy interests that could be
 implicated by disclosure of the information.... When you carefully consider
 FOIA requests and decide to withhold records, in whole or in part, you
 can be assured that the Department of Justice will defend your decisions
 unless they lack a sound legal basis.. .39
 In other words, during the Clinton administration government agen
 cies would have to demonstrate harm to justify withholding information
 requested under FOIA, or the Department of Justice would not defend
 them in court. During the second Bush administration, agency heads can
 rest easy if they have any legal justification for withholding information,
 and they receive no encouragement to release information.
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 The United States is not the only democracy where conflicting opinions
 on transparency are evident. Britain is in the midst of a major struggle over
 implementation of its new freedom of information law, enacted in No
 vember 2000. Prime Minister Tony Blair wanted to delay implementation
 until all 50,000 government bodies were prepared to adopt its provisions.
 Others in the government, including the lord chancellor Lord Irvine who
 is responsible for overseeing implementation, wanted to phase the law in
 gradually over three years. The prime minister won. As a result, the Act
 will not come into effect until January 2005, more than four years after
 parliament passed it.40 And as we will see below, the September 11, 2001
 attacks have led Canada to attempt to crack down on its Access to Informa
 tion Act provisions.
 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
 As the world becomes increasingly tightly integrated, international organiza
 tions are becoming important actors in the transparency debate. They are
 particularly interesting actors, because they are on both sides simultane
 ously: demanding greater transparency from others but often resisting the
 application of transparency's principles to themselves.
 For several years, the World Bank and especially the International
 Monetary Fund have pressed their member governments to make public
 information on a range of governmental economic and financial data. They
 argue that such transparency is necessary if countries are to attract foreign
 investment. Since 1996, the IMF has had a Special Data Dissemination
 Standard in place for countries that have or are seeking access to interna
 tional capital markets.41 (Countries not yet trying to integrate themselves
 into the global economy are expected to follow a less demanding General
 Data Dissemination Standard.) Scores of countries that subscribe to the
 Special Data Dissemination Standard list information on the Fund's Dis
 semination Standard Bulleting Board. The IMF has also adopted a Code
 of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency and has released a Manual on
 Fiscal Transparency.
 But the battle to open up governmental economic information is far
 from won. Particularly when it comes to national budgets, governmental
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 officials face strong incentives to muddy the waters. After all, if citizens
 know exactly how much money is being spent on what, they might object
 to the choices being made and demand changes in the policies?or in the
 officials. Governments thus resort to all sorts of tricks that enable them to
 hide taxes, overemphasize the benefits of spending, and conceal govern
 ment liabilities. They present highly optimistic projections of growth and
 tax revenues, and then express surprise at later deficits. They keep some
 items off-budget or postpone major changes to late years.42
 In addition to their role as proponents of national transparency,
 international organizations are targets of calls for greater disclosure. No
 international organization has faced more vociferous demands to open up
 than the World Bank. Beginning in the early 1980s, a wide range of NGOs
 began pressuring the Bank to be more forthcoming about its plans and
 policies, arguing that "if development bank project planning and design
 In addition to their
 role as proponents of
 national transparency,
 international organiza
 tions are targets of calls
 for greater disclosure.
 No international organi
 zation has faced more
 vociferous demands to
 open up than the World
 Bank.
 were open and transparent...fewer
 disastrous projects would be ap
 proved and a greater opportunity to
 promote development alternatives
 would exist."43 Three different trans
 national civil society networks?on
 poverty, environment, and structural
 adjustment?have coalesced around
 opposition to World Bank projects
 and procedures.44
 The proponents of World Bank
 transparency are right. In the days
 when the Bank remained cloaked
 in secrecy, too often government officials in both borrowing and donor
 countries were less concerned with the quality of the projects being funded
 than with such considerations as the political imperatives of channeling funds
 to particular governments or the opportunities for personal enrichment or
 political power. Although at least some of the actors now demanding trans
 parency from the Bank undoubtedly have their own agendas, if the Bank
 becomes truly transparent all agendas will have to be contested openly.
 These pressures for transparency have had an impact, in part because
 the argument has resonated so effectively with U.S. policymakers. Members
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 of Congress proved willing to hold funding for the Bank hostage to the
 establishment of new Bank disclosure policies.45 Under the disclosure
 policy established over a decade ago, the Bank releases a project informa
 tion document on every project. Also available are final staff appraisal reports,
 environmental impact statements, and other documents.
 Since then, there has been much rhetoric from the Bank promoting a
 more participatory model of development. Bank President James Wolfen
 sohn began emphasizing the importance of "inclusive decision-making"
 processes. Bank publications began stressing the importance of "empower
 ment" in reducing poverty. Because access to information is a necessary
 (though not sufficient) condition for such participatory development,
 expectations were high when the disclosure policy came up for revision
 in 2000. But the revision of the disclosure policy turned out to entail a
 considerable fight, one that usefully illustrates the ongoing political struggle
 over transparency throughout the world.
 The Bank staff who drafted the revisions found themselves facing
 competing pressures. Although the Bank already releases enough infor
 mation to allow for after-the-fact accountability, its disclosures do not
 enable citizens to participate in policy debates before decisions are made.
 On one side were civil-society groups from all parts of the world, along
 with the governments of a few wealthy countries, who called for much
 more disclosure of Bank documents. This side argued that information
 disclosure is essential to foster informed public debate and constructive
 engagement between society and government, a crucial if often missing
 piece of the development puzzle. Moreover, the pervasive fears of Bank
 and Fund interference with national sovereignty can only be assuaged if
 the public, including the legislature and other representative institutions,
 are informed about what decisions are actually being made and by whom.
 Disclosure of what the Bank is doing and what agreements it is signing with
 governments is necessary if the Bank is to deliver on promises to include
 new voices in the deliberative process.
 On the other side were many governments, particularly from the larger
 developing countries. (Smaller countries have already essentially been forced
 by the world's wealthiest nations to disclose documents that richer devel
 oping countries are still permitted to keep secret.) They argued that it is
 up to them, not to the Bank, to determine what information ought to be
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 released at what time and to whom. Information needs to be restricted to
 prevent market upheavals and to "protect the deliberative process." When
 pushed, off-the-record some said that what they most objected to was the
 possibility that their political opposition at home would use information
 from Bank documents in political fights against them?exactly what political
 oppositions are supposed to do in democracies.
 In the end, anti-transparency forces largely won. The Bank's revised
 disclosure policy makes only minor improvements, and most significantly
 does not release project appraisals or country assistance strategies before the
 Bank's Board takes action on them. In other words, the policy continues to
 permit only after-the-fact accountability, not informed participation during
 the planning and decision-making processes.
 Even the existing disclosures often do not measure up to expecta
 tions. Whether meaningful transparency has been achieved?or can be
 achieved?at the World Bank remains unclear. As is virtually always the
 case, policies from above to promote transparency within an institution
 provide only a starting point. Whether project information documents
 actually contain information that make it possible for outsiders to com
 ment meaningfully on projects in the early stages of planning will depend
 on the incentives World Bank staff face. If staffers are rewarded primarily
 for getting large projects through the pipeline quickly, they will have every
 incentive to make those documents as bland and meaningless as possible,
 in order to ward off objections to their projects. If, however, Bank staff are
 held accountable for the ultimate success of projects, they will have every
 incentive to permit widespread participation in the planning and prepara
 tion of projects in order to be able to anticipate problems and ensure that
 stakeholders in the borrowing countries support rather than oppose those
 projects. In short, the disclosure policy by itself means little. It can be just
 another bureaucratic hurdle, or it can be a useful and welcome tool.
 Beyond this question of the utility of transparency as a means of helping
 the Bank do its job better lies the moral issue discussed above. The Bank is
 not an end in itself. It exists to provide certain services. It was constituted
 by national governments, but its avowed goal is to help the world's poor.
 In other words the Bank is an agent, but it answers to two quite different
 principals: those affected by the projects it helps to finance and the govern
 ments of its member states. Governments are in turn supposed to be agents
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 for their citizens. When governments use Bank funds in ways that are not in
 the interests of their citizens and those citizens complain to the Bank about
 those uses, should the Bank withhold information from affected citizens
 on the grounds that only their governments?their supposed agents?are
 entitled to see that information?
 The World Trade Organization is now undergoing a similar debate
 over what information it should make public. As the disciplines of the
 global-trading system have grown more effective, they have alarmed
 many people now demonstrating their concerns both on the streets and in
 repeated demands for greater transparency. Many governments, especially
 from developing countries, object strongly to calls for greater citizen par
 ticipation, arguing that public input should take place only at the national
 level and that both negotiations and
 dispute settlement are properly
 handled exclusively by governments,
 who will decide for themselves what
 information to release to their citi
 zens. In part, their objections stem
 from the North-South imbalance.
 Northern civil society groups, includ
 ing trade associations, generally have
 the resources to engage the WTO.
 Many Southern governments fear
 that allowing greater civil-society
 participation will further turn the
 If the WTO wishes to
 recapture widespread
 public legitimacy, it
 needs to undertake
 a systematic effort to
 address the widespread
 public perception that
 the international trade
 regime is largely closed
 to public scrutiny and
 participation.
 odds against them. It is understandable that these new WTO members are
 reluctant to dilute the benefits of their membership to this once-exclusive
 "club." But civil society demands have become so strong, effective, and
 globally connected that efforts to fend them off will only result in dam
 age to the WTO as a whole. If the WTO wishes to recapture widespread
 public legitimacy, it needs to undertake a systematic effort to address the
 widespread public perception that the international trade regime is largely
 closed to public scrutiny and participation.
 The WTO's relationship with the outside world has already begun
 to change. The increasing impact of trade rules on other policy areas has
 compelled the WTO to engage in regular interaction with a wider range of
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 multilateral organizations, especially the United Nations Environment and
 Development Programs (UNEP and UNDP, respectively). Growing public
 interest in its work has compelled the WTO to organize public meetings
 and consultations, as well as engage in a series of regional conferences and
 workshops designed to encourage interaction between the Secretariat and
 the public. The WTO Secretariat has also made significant progress toward
 document availability. Its 1996 derestriction policy, informal but regularized
 meetings with the public, and the Internet now enable more people around
 the world to review its material.
 Nevertheless, citizens still lack access to information that would enable
 them to comment on policy as it is being considered or present their views
 in any meaningful way. Citizens must be empowered to participate in the
 formation of trade policy before decisions are made, not after. While public
 participation is seldom efficient, democratic governments must earn public
 support by engaging in a degree of open discussion, sharing information,
 and subjecting their decisions to public scrutiny. The WTO has yet to satisfy
 civil-society groups on these counts.
 Other intergovernmental organizations have done better. Indeed,
 efforts to remain opaque are swimming against a powerful tide of greater
 citizen participation in global institutions. The United Nations and many
 of its agencies routinely involve NGOs in their deliberations, with standard
 procedures in place for accreditation. In intergovernmental treaty nego
 tiations on many issues, non-governmental organizations have become
 constructive players with full access to information. They are routinely
 incorporated into negotiations on environmental issues, receiving country
 position-papers and draft treaties as a matter of course.
 SAVING THE ENVIRONMENT THROUGH TRANSPARENCY
 The issue area where transparency has as of yet contributed the most is
 environment. The story begins in the United States over fifteen years ago.
 In 1986, in response to the Bhopal catastrophe in India, the U.S. Congress
 enacted the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act. This
 Act requires companies to disclose what amounts of a few hundred specified
 toxic chemicals they release into the air or the water or onto the land (above
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 certain threshold levels). The companies must send the information to the
 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which uses it to compile a
 Toxics Release Inventory that is then made public. The act itself puts no
 limits on emissions of these toxic chemicals. It merely requires companies to
 own up publicly about what they are emitting. But that has proved sufficient
 to bring about an enormous change in behavior. Emissions of the indexed
 chemicals at facilities covered by the law fell 44 percent between 1988 and
 1994, even though production of those chemicals rose 18 percent. No
 environmentalist would have dared dream of getting a 44 percent reduc
 tion mandated by the usual types
 of environmental regulations. It
 turns out that regulation by
 revelation can work much better
 than the more traditional regula
 tion by governmental dictate.
 The success of this new ap
 proach has drawn the most sin
 cere form of flattery?imitation.
 Indonesia in recent years adopted
 a similar, but simpler, approach,
 publicly grading facilities by color
 according to how well they meet
 existing regulations. According
 to the World Bank, the pro
 gram is significantly increasing
 compliance with environmental
 The Community Right-to
 Know Act puts no limits
 on emissions of toxic
 chemicals. It merely re
 quires companies to own
 up publicly about what
 they are emitting. But that
 has proved sufficient to
 bring about an enormous
 change in behavior... It
 turns out that regulation by
 revelation can work much
 better than the more
 traditional regulation by
 governmental dictate.
 regulations. Its success, due to the pressure of both local public opinion
 and the business community's desire to market to environmentally sensitive
 foreign consumers, has spurred further imitation. In 1997, the Philip
 pines announced the introduction of a public-information program called
 Ecowatch. Mexico's environmental agency recently announced that it will
 begin to publish information on the environmental performance of 3,000
 industries to provide incentives for them to clean up their act.
 Governments are not the only ones attempting to use information to
 improve the state of the environment. A major U.S. environmental group
 called Environmental Defense has launched a website called "Scorecard"
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 (www.scorecard.org) that makes TRI and other data accessible to anyone
 with an Internet connection. The site is very user-friendly. An American
 types in his or her postal code, and up pops a map that displays local schools,
 major roads, and TRI facilities. Included is information on the relative
 toxicity of specific compounds and rankings of which facilities pose the
 biggest health threats. The site has been the topic of stories in the national
 television news and national news magazines. And it is heavily used, with
 over 11 million hits in its first year of operation.
 An Indian non-governmental organization, the Centre for Science
 and Environment (CSE), is also pursuing the transparency approach to
 environmental regulation, publishing ratings that compare companies within
 a given industry on their environmental performance. Since the Indian gov
 ernment does not require companies to provide public information about
 environmental records, the CSE decided to ask the companies directly. To
 induce companies to provide information, the CSE adopted a carrot and
 stick policy. The stick was that any company that failed to provide informa
 tion would automatically be ranked at the bottom. The carrot was that if
 companies could prove they were trying to improve their environmental
 performance, their efforts would be reflected in the rankings.
 With funding from the United Nations Development Programme (fun
 neled through the Indian government), CSE set out to rank companies in
 the pulp-and-paper industry, a renowned polluter. Much to the surprise of
 CSE, by the time the ratings were released, every company in the industry
 had provided the requested information, apparently convinced that the
 harm to their reputations of refusing to comply?and thus being ranked
 last?outweighed any possible harm from complying with the survey. Al
 though the rankings were released only this summer, CSE claims already
 to have had an impact, primarily by raising the profile of environmental
 concerns to the highest levels within the companies.
 RESPONSES TO SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
 In short, while transparency is highly desirable, it is by no means inevitable.
 Many of the responses to the horrific events of September 11,2001 provide
 powerful evidence of governmental ability and willingness to fight back
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 against transparency. Although the national struggles described above are
 part of the long-term seesaw between opponents and proponents of trans
 parency, particularly in the United States, September 11 spurred substantial
 backsliding from previous progress toward greater transparency.
 Most notable is the newly popular practice of "scrubbing" websites,
 i.e., removing information that someone believes might aid terrorists
 in planning attacks. Ironically, the Government Secrecy Project at the
 Federation of American Scientists, one of the leading NGO proponents of
 governmental transparency, removed information from its own web site,
 primarily concerning the location of secure intelligence facilities on the
 grounds that such information was
 not publicly available elsewhere.46
 Other scrubs raised more serious
 concerns about the appropriate bal
 ance between protecting legitimate
 secrets and ensuring that citizens
 have the information necessary to
 protect themselves.
 The Environmental Protection
 Agency, for example, has removed
 a database with information on
 chemicals used at 15,000 industrial
 sites in the United States.47 The
 database was the result of a Congres
 sional requirement several years ago,
 after the Bhopal disaster in India,
 that companies submit information
 about potential toxic waste spills so
 that local emergency services and
 residents could make appropriate
 Particularly in the United
 States, September 11
 spurred substantial
 backsliding from previ
 ous progress toward
 greater transparency.
 Most notable is the new
 ly popular practice of
 "scrubbing" websites...
 Ironically, the Govern
 ment Secrecy Project at
 the Federation of Ameri
 can Scientists, one of
 the leading NGO propo
 nents of governmental
 transparency, removed
 information from its own
 web site.
 plans to deal with worst-case scenarios.48 But now, the EPA apparently feels
 that the danger of providing terrorists with ready access to such information
 outweighs the public's right to know whether their children's day-care
 centers are located next to potentially dangerous chemical sites.
 Other government agencies, including many at the state level, are
 pursuing a similar course of action. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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 temporarily closed down its web site altogether, and when it reopened
 the web site restored only "select content." The Internal Revenue Service
 now prohibits unescorted public access to the reading rooms Congress
 required it to establish, ostensibly out of concern for employee safety.
 The state of Pennsylvania has removed some environmental information
 from its website, and the state of Florida is withholding public access to
 information on crop dusters.49
 Since there are other easy ways for terrorists to locate significant targets,
 not least by looking in the phone book, it is at least debatable whether such
 removal of information actually serves the interests of the American public.
 The greatest danger is not that information about vulnerable facilities might
 be misused. The danger is that making it difficult for citizens to find out
 about vulnerable facilities makes it far less likely that the vulnerabilities will
 be corrected or that sensible precautionary planning to deal with potential
 attacks will take place.
 The United States is not alone in its concerns over transparency in
 an age of terrorism. The Canadian government introduced legislation in
 October 2001 that would entitle the Minister of Justice to issue certificates
 suspending applications of Canada's Access to Information Act. Department
 of Justice officials claimed that terrorist groups had used the Act to try
 to obtain sensitive information, although they admitted that no sensitive
 information was actually released.50 The Justice Minister argued that the
 change was necessary to maintain information-sharing agreements with
 Canada's allies.51
 THE FUTURE OF TRANSPARENCY
 The struggle to create a broad global culture of transparency still clearly
 has far to go. The cliche about information being power has much truth
 to it, and holders of such power are rarely willing to share it in the absence
 of compelling incentives. But the opponents of greater transparency are
 not merely the vested interests. Secrecy is a deep-rooted habit of thought
 in many circles. Overcoming all this will take long-term, consistent effort,
 with a healthy respect for the relatively narrow sets of circumstances in
 which secrecy is truly more appropriate.
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 Fortunately, the promoters of transparency have some powerful weapons
 on their side as wTell. First, the broad trend toward greater democracy brings
 with it a normative shift more accepting of transparency principles. When
 governments are seen as entities whose purpose it is to serve the public
 interest, governmental rights to keep secrets from the public face a higher
 standard of justification. Second, in issue areas from security to economics
 to environment, many parts of the world have enjoyed much success with
 transparency, providing powerful models of how disclosure can serve broad
 public interests.
 To ensure that these positive trends continue will require concerted
 action on the part of many people. The broad trend toward appropriate
 national legislation needs to be strengthened. International organizations
 need to commit themselves to serious disclosure policies. The wide array
 of civil society groups and others working to promote transparency need
 to collaborate across issue areas and national and organizational boundar
 ies. The various rationales for continued secrecy (and particularly the new
 justifications based on anti-terrorism efforts) need to be fully and publicly
 evaluated. The fight will not be easy, and it will probably never be fully
 won. But the progress made in recent decades provides good reason to
 believe that further progress is possible.
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